1 00:00:02,690 --> 00:00:04,912 So . Ladies , gentlemen , thank you for 2 00:00:04,912 --> 00:00:07,210 joining us today . My lieutenant 3 00:00:07,210 --> 00:00:09,270 Colonel , your eye or lean on , uh , 4 00:00:09,400 --> 00:00:13,280 with us today is the deputy assistant 5 00:00:13,300 --> 00:00:15,522 Secretary of Defense for space Policy , 6 00:00:15,522 --> 00:00:17,633 Steve Pate . And he'll be speaking to 7 00:00:17,633 --> 00:00:19,689 us today about the new defense space 8 00:00:19,689 --> 00:00:21,911 strategy on . Then we'll open it up for 9 00:00:21,911 --> 00:00:23,911 your questions . Does he could take 10 00:00:24,140 --> 00:00:26,362 thank you . I'm honored to be here with 11 00:00:26,362 --> 00:00:28,196 you all today to discuss our new 12 00:00:28,196 --> 00:00:30,380 defense space strategy . It's an 13 00:00:30,380 --> 00:00:33,450 extremely exciting and important time 14 00:00:33,460 --> 00:00:36,390 for a nation space program . I imagine 15 00:00:36,390 --> 00:00:38,680 many of you watch the recent NASA 16 00:00:38,690 --> 00:00:41,480 launch of a Space X rocket sending 17 00:00:41,480 --> 00:00:44,850 American astronauts to space from 18 00:00:44,850 --> 00:00:47,450 American soil for the first time in 19 00:00:47,450 --> 00:00:49,450 almost a decade . And for the first 20 00:00:49,450 --> 00:00:52,270 time in a commercial rocket , I sat 21 00:00:52,270 --> 00:00:54,620 with my wife and my nine year old sign 22 00:00:54,890 --> 00:00:56,779 and six year old daughter on that 23 00:00:56,779 --> 00:00:59,180 beautiful Saturday afternoon , and we 24 00:00:59,180 --> 00:01:01,930 collectively held our breath as the 25 00:01:01,930 --> 00:01:04,630 rocket counted down the final 10 26 00:01:04,630 --> 00:01:07,040 seconds . As I'm sure many people 27 00:01:07,110 --> 00:01:09,540 across the nation and the globe did the 28 00:01:09,540 --> 00:01:13,230 same . These moments are 29 00:01:13,230 --> 00:01:16,520 amazing , capturing the attention and 30 00:01:16,520 --> 00:01:19,450 imagination of people around the world . 31 00:01:20,120 --> 00:01:22,320 However , beyond these moments , what 32 00:01:22,320 --> 00:01:25,430 people may not realize is how dependent 33 00:01:25,440 --> 00:01:29,400 we are on space . Space is used 34 00:01:29,410 --> 00:01:32,440 for a day to day life not only as we 35 00:01:32,440 --> 00:01:35,030 navigate in our cars , but for a global 36 00:01:35,030 --> 00:01:37,130 economy as well as our nation's 37 00:01:37,130 --> 00:01:40,740 security . So why should Americans care 38 00:01:40,750 --> 00:01:44,150 about space ? Because they depend on it . 39 00:01:44,840 --> 00:01:46,618 Not only do they depend on it , 40 00:01:46,890 --> 00:01:49,110 international peace and security 41 00:01:49,110 --> 00:01:52,190 depends on it . Our nation's soldiers , 42 00:01:52,190 --> 00:01:55,240 sailors , airman and Marines depend on 43 00:01:55,240 --> 00:01:58,970 it now . I wish I could say that 44 00:01:58,970 --> 00:02:01,650 space was a sea of tranquility in the 45 00:02:01,650 --> 00:02:04,520 sanctuary from attack . But the fact of 46 00:02:04,520 --> 00:02:07,050 the matter is , space is contested . 47 00:02:07,970 --> 00:02:11,440 Outer space has emerged as a key arena , 48 00:02:11,610 --> 00:02:14,600 a potential conflict in an era of great 49 00:02:14,600 --> 00:02:17,610 power competition . China and Russia 50 00:02:17,610 --> 00:02:20,200 have weaponized spaced and turned it 51 00:02:20,210 --> 00:02:23,950 into a war fighting dummy . Their 52 00:02:23,960 --> 00:02:26,300 actions pose the greatest strategic 53 00:02:26,300 --> 00:02:28,770 threat with the on going development , 54 00:02:28,950 --> 00:02:31,700 testing and deployment of counter space 55 00:02:31,700 --> 00:02:34,360 systems and the associated military 56 00:02:34,360 --> 00:02:37,150 doctrine designed to hold the Allied 57 00:02:37,640 --> 00:02:41,380 and U . S . Space systems at risk . But 58 00:02:41,380 --> 00:02:44,120 while there may be challenges in space , 59 00:02:44,500 --> 00:02:46,490 we also have unprecedented 60 00:02:46,500 --> 00:02:49,350 opportunities . We're in a moment of 61 00:02:49,350 --> 00:02:52,080 historic reform , with tremendous 62 00:02:52,080 --> 00:02:54,890 visionary leaders in place from the 63 00:02:54,890 --> 00:02:57,210 president to the vice president to the 64 00:02:57,210 --> 00:03:00,310 secretary of defense . In a bipartisan 65 00:03:00,310 --> 00:03:03,250 congress that has supported or National 66 00:03:03,250 --> 00:03:06,300 Security Space program , we have stood 67 00:03:06,300 --> 00:03:08,660 up the United States Space Force as a 68 00:03:08,660 --> 00:03:10,890 new branch of the armed forces . The 69 00:03:10,890 --> 00:03:13,200 United States Space Command has a new 70 00:03:13,200 --> 00:03:15,570 combatant command and undertaken 71 00:03:15,570 --> 00:03:17,900 significant acquisition reforms , 72 00:03:18,210 --> 00:03:20,154 including the establishment of the 73 00:03:20,154 --> 00:03:22,570 Space Development Agency to accelerate 74 00:03:22,570 --> 00:03:24,540 the development and delivery of 75 00:03:24,540 --> 00:03:27,360 capabilities to our war fighters . I 76 00:03:27,360 --> 00:03:30,550 see this progress as gears of a 77 00:03:30,550 --> 00:03:34,250 powerful machine clicking into place . 78 00:03:35,590 --> 00:03:37,660 And very importantly , I'd like to 79 00:03:37,660 --> 00:03:40,570 highlight that we are not alone in our 80 00:03:40,570 --> 00:03:44,340 endeavors . Our space capable allies 81 00:03:44,340 --> 00:03:47,060 and partners as well as a growing and 82 00:03:47,070 --> 00:03:49,880 innovative space industry offer 83 00:03:49,880 --> 00:03:52,020 tremendous opportunities for 84 00:03:52,020 --> 00:03:55,850 cooperation . So what is our strategy ? 85 00:03:56,840 --> 00:03:59,560 The defense space strategy defines the 86 00:03:59,560 --> 00:04:02,050 strategic environment and the critical 87 00:04:02,050 --> 00:04:04,450 moment that were at and in turn 88 00:04:04,680 --> 00:04:07,030 identifies the ends were trying to 89 00:04:07,030 --> 00:04:10,190 achieve the ways were the ways we're 90 00:04:10,190 --> 00:04:12,520 going to achieve them and the means to 91 00:04:12,520 --> 00:04:16,250 do so . With strategy is 92 00:04:16,250 --> 00:04:18,900 about ends , ways and means . 93 00:04:21,630 --> 00:04:23,797 The defense space strategy is designed 94 00:04:23,797 --> 00:04:26,110 to serve as the road map to advance our 95 00:04:26,110 --> 00:04:29,420 nation's military space power by 96 00:04:29,420 --> 00:04:31,031 guiding the most significant 97 00:04:31,031 --> 00:04:33,270 transformation in the history of the 98 00:04:33,270 --> 00:04:35,810 National Security Space Program . This 99 00:04:35,810 --> 00:04:38,290 is an enterprise wide transformation 100 00:04:38,530 --> 00:04:40,750 from approaching space as a support 101 00:04:40,750 --> 00:04:43,640 function . Two . Approaching space as a 102 00:04:43,640 --> 00:04:45,730 war fighting domain in which we're 103 00:04:45,730 --> 00:04:48,270 postured to compete , to turn and win 104 00:04:49,240 --> 00:04:51,240 the defense space strategy provides 105 00:04:51,240 --> 00:04:53,820 strategic direction for department wide 106 00:04:53,820 --> 00:04:55,950 changes to policies , doctrine , 107 00:04:55,950 --> 00:04:58,290 capabilities , operations and 108 00:04:58,290 --> 00:05:01,000 partnerships to ensure US space 109 00:05:01,000 --> 00:05:03,690 superiority to secure nation's vital 110 00:05:03,690 --> 00:05:07,020 interest in space or desired 111 00:05:07,020 --> 00:05:09,630 conditions are a secure , stable and 112 00:05:09,630 --> 00:05:12,770 accessible space . Don't mean the 113 00:05:12,770 --> 00:05:14,780 strategy outlines the following key 114 00:05:14,780 --> 00:05:17,002 strategic objectives for the department 115 00:05:18,040 --> 00:05:21,450 first maintained space superiority . 116 00:05:22,080 --> 00:05:24,191 The D . O . D . Will preserve freedom 117 00:05:24,191 --> 00:05:26,490 of operations in the domain , and we 118 00:05:26,490 --> 00:05:28,770 won't be prepared to protect and defend 119 00:05:28,770 --> 00:05:31,050 our interests from the hostile use of 120 00:05:31,050 --> 00:05:34,840 space . Second provides space 121 00:05:34,840 --> 00:05:36,990 support to national , joint and 122 00:05:36,990 --> 00:05:39,880 combined operations . We use space to 123 00:05:39,880 --> 00:05:42,140 improve life here on Earth and the D . 124 00:05:42,140 --> 00:05:44,362 O . D will continue to provide critical 125 00:05:44,362 --> 00:05:46,362 space capabilities to the joint and 126 00:05:46,362 --> 00:05:50,110 combined force . Third , ensure space 127 00:05:50,110 --> 00:05:53,790 superior stability . Our focus is to 128 00:05:53,790 --> 00:05:57,020 deter aggression and to maintain a safe 129 00:05:57,220 --> 00:05:59,850 and sustainable space a moment . The D . 130 00:05:59,850 --> 00:06:01,961 O . D . Will be a good steward of the 131 00:06:01,961 --> 00:06:04,440 domain . We will achieve these 132 00:06:04,440 --> 00:06:07,220 objectives through a phased approach , 133 00:06:07,420 --> 00:06:09,710 moving with purpose and speed across 134 00:06:09,710 --> 00:06:12,350 four lines of effort , build , 135 00:06:13,030 --> 00:06:16,080 integrate , shape and cooperate . 136 00:06:17,460 --> 00:06:20,210 Line of effort one . Built . Build a 137 00:06:20,210 --> 00:06:22,640 comprehensive military advantage in 138 00:06:22,640 --> 00:06:25,130 space . We will build out the space 139 00:06:25,130 --> 00:06:27,390 force developing the doctrine , 140 00:06:27,400 --> 00:06:30,100 expertise , culture and capabilities 141 00:06:30,340 --> 00:06:33,070 needed to outpace future threats . This 142 00:06:33,070 --> 00:06:35,140 includes building space intelligence 143 00:06:35,360 --> 00:06:38,460 and command and control line of effort 144 00:06:38,470 --> 00:06:42,350 to integrate , integrate military space 145 00:06:42,350 --> 00:06:44,840 power into national joint fine 146 00:06:44,840 --> 00:06:47,640 operations . U . S Space Command has a 147 00:06:47,640 --> 00:06:50,280 lead role here in ensuring space powers 148 00:06:50,290 --> 00:06:53,010 integrated with all forms of military 149 00:06:53,010 --> 00:06:55,121 power and that we have been necessary 150 00:06:55,121 --> 00:06:57,880 planning exercises and authorities in 151 00:06:57,880 --> 00:07:00,330 place to protect an offender nation's 152 00:07:00,330 --> 00:07:03,830 interest . Line of effort . Three . 153 00:07:04,200 --> 00:07:06,950 Shape . Shape the strategic environment 154 00:07:07,620 --> 00:07:11,200 as we work to deter those to attack us 155 00:07:11,200 --> 00:07:13,920 in space . We want to enhance stability 156 00:07:13,930 --> 00:07:16,140 in the domain . We have to work 157 00:07:16,150 --> 00:07:18,540 internationally to develop standards of 158 00:07:18,540 --> 00:07:20,540 behaviour of what constitutes 159 00:07:20,540 --> 00:07:23,110 acceptable and unacceptable actions . 160 00:07:24,720 --> 00:07:27,550 Line of effort for cooperate , 161 00:07:28,200 --> 00:07:30,450 cooperate with allies , partners , 162 00:07:30,520 --> 00:07:32,740 industry and other U . S . Government 163 00:07:32,740 --> 00:07:35,820 departments and agencies . Partnerships 164 00:07:35,820 --> 00:07:38,330 are key to the success of a strategic 165 00:07:38,330 --> 00:07:41,950 approach , in summary that the 166 00:07:41,950 --> 00:07:44,210 defense space strategy lays out a path 167 00:07:44,210 --> 00:07:46,780 that embraces space as a unique domain 168 00:07:47,200 --> 00:07:49,910 of national military power and together 169 00:07:49,910 --> 00:07:52,540 with other domains , underpins joint 170 00:07:52,550 --> 00:07:55,080 and combined operations to advance 171 00:07:55,080 --> 00:07:57,820 national security . The unclassified 172 00:07:57,820 --> 00:07:59,931 summary of the strategy is provided . 173 00:08:00,000 --> 00:08:02,222 In fact , sheets are online , and we'll 174 00:08:02,222 --> 00:08:04,389 be working with our closest allies and 175 00:08:04,389 --> 00:08:06,333 partners in front their classified 176 00:08:06,333 --> 00:08:08,480 elements . Thank you for your time 177 00:08:08,480 --> 00:08:10,536 today , and I'm happy to address any 178 00:08:10,536 --> 00:08:12,980 questions . Okay , let's start with 179 00:08:12,990 --> 00:08:15,046 Sylvie . With AP , They have peace . 180 00:08:16,980 --> 00:08:20,060 Hello , Thank you . I have a question 181 00:08:20,060 --> 00:08:23,810 about the Allies . I Aren't you 182 00:08:23,820 --> 00:08:27,670 concerned that your quest to 183 00:08:27,680 --> 00:08:31,570 cooperate with allies in space 184 00:08:31,880 --> 00:08:35,770 could be Joep arised by President 185 00:08:35,780 --> 00:08:39,710 Trump's wheel to withdraw from many 186 00:08:40,000 --> 00:08:42,520 important international disarmament 187 00:08:42,530 --> 00:08:46,490 treaties ? Well , what I'd say from ah 188 00:08:46,500 --> 00:08:49,280 lines perspective is our allies have 189 00:08:49,280 --> 00:08:52,810 had strong interest in cooperating with 190 00:08:52,810 --> 00:08:55,150 the United States and space . And 191 00:08:55,150 --> 00:08:56,983 what's interesting is there at a 192 00:08:56,983 --> 00:08:59,720 similar moment , as we are at in space , 193 00:08:59,720 --> 00:09:01,664 where there's a recognition of the 194 00:09:01,664 --> 00:09:04,150 criticality of the domain , as well as 195 00:09:04,150 --> 00:09:06,200 the threats that were facing . So 196 00:09:06,200 --> 00:09:08,130 they're looking to enhance those 197 00:09:08,130 --> 00:09:11,790 partnerships . For instance , NATO 198 00:09:11,800 --> 00:09:14,860 recently declared space and operational 199 00:09:14,860 --> 00:09:16,700 domain . They're recognizing the 200 00:09:16,700 --> 00:09:19,200 threats to our interests . We're also 201 00:09:19,200 --> 00:09:21,256 working in what we call the Combined 202 00:09:21,256 --> 00:09:23,478 Space Operations Initiative see spoke , 203 00:09:23,640 --> 00:09:27,110 and this is a partnership that we have 204 00:09:27,120 --> 00:09:29,440 with our five eyes . Nations , which is 205 00:09:29,440 --> 00:09:31,329 an intelligence partnership which 206 00:09:31,329 --> 00:09:34,090 includes the US , Canada , UK , 207 00:09:34,150 --> 00:09:37,200 Australia and New Zealand in France and 208 00:09:37,200 --> 00:09:39,390 Germany , have recently come on board 209 00:09:39,610 --> 00:09:43,370 with C spoke So So I would say 210 00:09:43,370 --> 00:09:46,570 that the opportunities for partnership 211 00:09:46,570 --> 00:09:48,459 are high . We're getting a strong 212 00:09:48,459 --> 00:09:50,700 demand signal from them . We're working 213 00:09:50,700 --> 00:09:52,922 with a number of other countries , such 214 00:09:52,922 --> 00:09:56,060 as Japan , on their efforts , and we 215 00:09:56,060 --> 00:09:57,782 look forward to deepening that 216 00:09:57,782 --> 00:10:00,670 cooperation . But I want to concern 217 00:10:00,670 --> 00:10:04,360 that there can be a difference in the 218 00:10:07,070 --> 00:10:10,910 finding a norms of behaviour . 219 00:10:11,060 --> 00:10:15,040 One example in space . Um , I would say 220 00:10:15,040 --> 00:10:17,410 it in my experience , often with any 221 00:10:17,410 --> 00:10:20,790 group of people , whether it's in the 222 00:10:20,790 --> 00:10:22,568 department , in the interagency 223 00:10:22,568 --> 00:10:24,790 internationally , people have different 224 00:10:24,790 --> 00:10:26,750 perspectives , and the important 225 00:10:26,750 --> 00:10:28,917 element is you work through them . You 226 00:10:28,917 --> 00:10:31,500 have conversations . So in defining 227 00:10:31,500 --> 00:10:33,778 norms of responsible behavior in space , 228 00:10:33,778 --> 00:10:36,190 there have been various activities that 229 00:10:36,200 --> 00:10:38,200 go on an international for of , for 230 00:10:38,200 --> 00:10:41,080 instance , the United Nations Committee 231 00:10:41,080 --> 00:10:43,191 on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space , 232 00:10:43,191 --> 00:10:45,302 where there was recently agreement on 233 00:10:45,302 --> 00:10:47,413 long term sustainability guidelines . 234 00:10:47,500 --> 00:10:49,760 Um , and then there's other efforts 235 00:10:49,760 --> 00:10:51,760 than below that where we're working 236 00:10:51,760 --> 00:10:54,210 closely with our allies and then here 237 00:10:54,210 --> 00:10:55,821 in the building and with the 238 00:10:55,821 --> 00:10:59,020 interagency to build upon the work 239 00:10:59,020 --> 00:11:00,631 that's been done on norms of 240 00:11:00,631 --> 00:11:03,090 responsible behavior in space . So I 241 00:11:03,090 --> 00:11:05,312 wouldn't say that it's gonna be without 242 00:11:05,312 --> 00:11:07,500 disagreement , but I am confident that 243 00:11:07,500 --> 00:11:09,278 we are going to be able to make 244 00:11:09,278 --> 00:11:11,056 progress in this area . This is 245 00:11:11,056 --> 00:11:13,200 something that happens in every other 246 00:11:13,200 --> 00:11:15,780 domain , and we've been able to figure 247 00:11:15,780 --> 00:11:18,180 it out , and I think in space will be 248 00:11:18,180 --> 00:11:21,420 able to do the same . Thank you . We'll 249 00:11:21,420 --> 00:11:23,642 go to David Martin in the room . This , 250 00:11:23,642 --> 00:11:26,140 uh , factory says China and Russia have 251 00:11:26,150 --> 00:11:29,590 weaponized space . Who , exactly how it 252 00:11:30,400 --> 00:11:33,790 happened . Eso Thank you for that 253 00:11:33,790 --> 00:11:37,650 question . I refer you to two reports 254 00:11:37,660 --> 00:11:39,382 that were put out there by the 255 00:11:39,382 --> 00:11:41,890 intelligence community early last year . 256 00:11:42,390 --> 00:11:44,720 The D I . A . Report . Challenges to 257 00:11:44,720 --> 00:11:47,920 Security and Space says that China and 258 00:11:47,920 --> 00:11:50,500 Russia are developing jamming and 259 00:11:50,500 --> 00:11:52,640 cyberspace capabilities , directed 260 00:11:52,640 --> 00:11:56,320 energy weapons on orbit capabilities 261 00:11:56,700 --> 00:11:58,478 and ground based anti satellite 262 00:11:58,478 --> 00:12:00,533 missiles that can achieve a range of 263 00:12:00,533 --> 00:12:03,650 reversible and irreversible effects 264 00:12:05,140 --> 00:12:08,310 that this document , the D . I A report 265 00:12:08,310 --> 00:12:10,421 as well as the unclassified knee sick 266 00:12:10,421 --> 00:12:12,520 report competing in space taken 267 00:12:12,520 --> 00:12:14,570 together have over 60 pages of 268 00:12:14,570 --> 00:12:16,540 information on threats including 269 00:12:16,540 --> 00:12:18,096 capabilities , doctrine and 270 00:12:18,096 --> 00:12:20,380 organizations . And these documents 271 00:12:20,380 --> 00:12:22,602 will tell you that China and Russia are 272 00:12:22,602 --> 00:12:24,324 developing and planning to use 273 00:12:24,324 --> 00:12:26,380 capabilities that threaten our space 274 00:12:26,380 --> 00:12:28,820 systems in those of our allies now . 275 00:12:28,820 --> 00:12:31,450 Since last year , when those were put 276 00:12:31,450 --> 00:12:35,330 out early last year , um , China and 277 00:12:35,330 --> 00:12:37,274 Russia have been conducting highly 278 00:12:37,274 --> 00:12:39,640 sophisticated on orbit activities which 279 00:12:39,640 --> 00:12:42,570 pose unprecedented new dangers to US 280 00:12:42,570 --> 00:12:45,430 and allied space systems . Earlier this 281 00:12:45,430 --> 00:12:47,820 year , General Raymond highlighted the 282 00:12:47,820 --> 00:12:50,920 concerning behavior of two new Russian 283 00:12:50,920 --> 00:12:53,350 satellites which fair , distinct 284 00:12:53,350 --> 00:12:55,520 similarities to other Russian 285 00:12:55,520 --> 00:12:57,840 satellites that launched a high speed 286 00:12:57,840 --> 00:13:01,560 projectile in 2017 . Also 287 00:13:01,560 --> 00:13:03,560 consistent with the guidance in the 288 00:13:03,560 --> 00:13:05,900 defense space strategy is to inform the 289 00:13:05,910 --> 00:13:08,070 public in the international community 290 00:13:08,070 --> 00:13:09,848 about these threats , and we're 291 00:13:09,848 --> 00:13:11,840 continuing to regularly review the 292 00:13:11,840 --> 00:13:15,290 information so we can share mawr about 293 00:13:15,290 --> 00:13:18,100 Chinese and Russian space activities to 294 00:13:18,100 --> 00:13:20,250 enable that more fulsome conversation 295 00:13:20,510 --> 00:13:22,399 on their weaponization of space . 296 00:13:24,200 --> 00:13:27,930 Just , uh , according from those 297 00:13:28,640 --> 00:13:30,473 documents from General Raymond , 298 00:13:32,650 --> 00:13:35,060 did you just say that China and Russia 299 00:13:35,060 --> 00:13:38,860 have put weapons in space ? I 300 00:13:39,290 --> 00:13:42,880 said what I said , quoting from 301 00:13:43,210 --> 00:13:46,610 the intelligence community , as well as 302 00:13:46,610 --> 00:13:48,777 when State Department talked about the 303 00:13:48,777 --> 00:13:50,888 activities in 2017 . They highlighted 304 00:13:50,888 --> 00:13:54,570 in 2018 and it is clear that they have 305 00:13:54,580 --> 00:13:57,660 weaponized space . You said that a 306 00:13:57,670 --> 00:13:59,614 Russian satellite had fired a high 307 00:13:59,614 --> 00:14:03,570 speed in 2017 . What 308 00:14:03,570 --> 00:14:05,570 happened ? What was discussed . And 309 00:14:05,570 --> 00:14:07,681 this is all in the public record that 310 00:14:07,681 --> 00:14:09,903 State Department actually brought up in 311 00:14:09,903 --> 00:14:11,792 the United Nations . There was an 312 00:14:11,792 --> 00:14:14,070 assistant secretary who spoke about it . 313 00:14:14,070 --> 00:14:18,010 Then there was a main satellite out 314 00:14:18,010 --> 00:14:20,780 of that satellite Russian satellite . A 315 00:14:20,780 --> 00:14:24,280 smaller satellite was birthed from that 316 00:14:24,280 --> 00:14:26,910 mean satellite . From that smaller 317 00:14:26,910 --> 00:14:30,360 satellite , a projectile was launched 318 00:14:30,570 --> 00:14:34,470 from that Russian satellite . So 1/3 319 00:14:34,570 --> 00:14:37,330 item came out . They said that this was 320 00:14:37,330 --> 00:14:40,990 an inspector satellite . What the State 321 00:14:40,990 --> 00:14:43,970 Department official noted at that time 322 00:14:43,970 --> 00:14:46,590 is the behavior of that satellite 323 00:14:46,830 --> 00:14:48,720 looked nothing like an inspector 324 00:14:48,720 --> 00:14:50,990 satellite and looked like something 325 00:14:50,990 --> 00:14:52,212 much more concerned . 326 00:14:54,740 --> 00:14:56,907 Said that they said the satellite that 327 00:14:56,907 --> 00:14:59,073 fired the high , high speed projectile 328 00:14:59,073 --> 00:15:01,184 was an inspector satellite . What was 329 00:15:01,184 --> 00:15:04,000 the project ? So the projectile was 330 00:15:04,000 --> 00:15:07,400 some object in space that did was was 331 00:15:07,400 --> 00:15:09,622 launched from the You have the mean one 332 00:15:09,622 --> 00:15:11,710 than the 2nd 1 came out of it . And 333 00:15:11,710 --> 00:15:13,766 then out of the 2nd 1 the projectile 334 00:15:13,766 --> 00:15:16,710 came out of it . That went into space 335 00:15:16,840 --> 00:15:18,951 and has not been moving since it went 336 00:15:18,951 --> 00:15:20,673 out and fired and has not been 337 00:15:20,673 --> 00:15:23,600 maneuvering or or giving any indication 338 00:15:23,770 --> 00:15:25,826 of what you would think an inspector 339 00:15:25,826 --> 00:15:27,714 satellite would look like . Third 340 00:15:27,714 --> 00:15:31,510 object 3rd 1 of the best . That's 341 00:15:31,510 --> 00:15:34,180 exactly , um , I don't know if they 342 00:15:34,180 --> 00:15:37,760 specified the whole system or down to 343 00:15:37,760 --> 00:15:41,260 the 3rd 1 They have to go back and look 344 00:15:41,260 --> 00:15:43,371 at that . But But I believe they were 345 00:15:43,371 --> 00:15:45,850 calling that an inspector system . But 346 00:15:45,990 --> 00:15:48,540 that system , with these three objects 347 00:15:48,540 --> 00:15:50,762 that came out of it , certainly did not 348 00:15:50,762 --> 00:15:53,550 look like it in what General Riemann 349 00:15:53,550 --> 00:15:56,080 highlighted earlier this year , is a 350 00:15:56,080 --> 00:15:59,050 system that looks just like that one , 351 00:15:59,740 --> 00:16:02,970 Um , is they had the main one , and 352 00:16:02,970 --> 00:16:05,380 then they have the 2nd 1 and what was 353 00:16:05,380 --> 00:16:07,470 different and what he highlighted 354 00:16:07,480 --> 00:16:10,010 earlier this year is they were then 355 00:16:10,010 --> 00:16:12,350 doing testing near a U . S . Government 356 00:16:12,350 --> 00:16:15,170 satellite . It hadn't nothing came out 357 00:16:15,170 --> 00:16:18,570 of it . Further . It's 358 00:16:18,570 --> 00:16:21,820 unclear if if something will or what 359 00:16:21,820 --> 00:16:24,260 they're doing . But he was concerned 360 00:16:24,260 --> 00:16:26,204 with that activity , and he talked 361 00:16:26,204 --> 00:16:28,427 about it publicly , and there were also 362 00:16:28,427 --> 00:16:30,649 bilateral discussions with the Russians 363 00:16:30,649 --> 00:16:32,871 on that just to be clear so that What ? 364 00:16:32,990 --> 00:16:35,850 That this 2nd 1 you're talking about 365 00:16:36,240 --> 00:16:38,780 operated close to it . Yes , us . 366 00:16:39,080 --> 00:16:41,690 That's another Bain satellite . Yes , 367 00:16:41,690 --> 00:16:43,801 without a smaller satellite cracked , 368 00:16:43,801 --> 00:16:46,860 which yet put out that third object . 369 00:16:46,980 --> 00:16:49,147 Absolutely correct . But it was near a 370 00:16:49,147 --> 00:16:51,369 U . S . Government satellite , and that 371 00:16:51,369 --> 00:16:54,820 was of concern . The phone lines were 372 00:16:54,820 --> 00:16:57,150 quick . Sandra Irwin Irwin with space 373 00:16:57,150 --> 00:17:01,100 news . Thank you very much , Mr 374 00:17:01,100 --> 00:17:03,070 Today . Thank you for doing this 375 00:17:03,080 --> 00:17:06,060 briefing I wanted to ask you about . 376 00:17:06,070 --> 00:17:09,760 The resource is in BOT to 377 00:17:09,760 --> 00:17:11,670 accomplish the strategy . Do you 378 00:17:11,670 --> 00:17:14,080 envision that this is going to be done 379 00:17:14,080 --> 00:17:16,680 within existing resources , or will you 380 00:17:16,680 --> 00:17:19,110 be asking for additional resources ? 381 00:17:19,110 --> 00:17:21,820 And have you had conversations with the 382 00:17:21,820 --> 00:17:23,931 air Force on the space Force on their 383 00:17:23,931 --> 00:17:26,210 budget priorities toe to align with a 384 00:17:26,220 --> 00:17:30,130 strategy ? Thank you . Um , so , 385 00:17:30,160 --> 00:17:34,000 uh , so the f y 21 386 00:17:34,000 --> 00:17:36,560 budget , which is now up on the hill . 387 00:17:36,880 --> 00:17:39,730 Um uh , and being debated in the 388 00:17:39,730 --> 00:17:42,170 department . Already proposed . Had $18 389 00:17:42,170 --> 00:17:44,750 billion for the department space 390 00:17:44,750 --> 00:17:46,806 program , not including the National 391 00:17:46,806 --> 00:17:50,260 Reconnaissance Office . Um , about 392 00:17:50,940 --> 00:17:53,220 15 . 16 billion of that was within the 393 00:17:53,220 --> 00:17:56,350 United States Space Force . That was a 394 00:17:56,360 --> 00:17:58,870 very significant budget . Tuffelli 395 00:17:58,870 --> 00:18:01,250 resource . The Space Force . I can't 396 00:18:01,250 --> 00:18:04,960 speak to the F Y 22 budget yet , but 397 00:18:04,960 --> 00:18:07,910 we are in deliberations on that budget 398 00:18:07,910 --> 00:18:09,854 right now within the Department of 399 00:18:09,854 --> 00:18:12,077 Defense . And how that process works is 400 00:18:12,260 --> 00:18:15,260 the space Force brings that proposal of 401 00:18:15,260 --> 00:18:17,371 what they think the necessary funding 402 00:18:17,371 --> 00:18:19,316 should be . And , as you stated to 403 00:18:19,316 --> 00:18:21,427 include funding the execution of this 404 00:18:21,427 --> 00:18:23,510 strategy on , they bring into the 405 00:18:23,510 --> 00:18:25,232 department the Air Force , the 406 00:18:25,232 --> 00:18:27,343 department , the Air Force reviews it 407 00:18:27,343 --> 00:18:29,232 and brings it to the secretary of 408 00:18:29,232 --> 00:18:31,288 defense , of which the Office of the 409 00:18:31,288 --> 00:18:33,560 Secretary of Defense reviews it and 410 00:18:34,190 --> 00:18:36,330 provides feedback . And the secretary 411 00:18:36,330 --> 00:18:38,350 of Defense then sends it to the 412 00:18:38,350 --> 00:18:40,461 president in Office of Management and 413 00:18:40,461 --> 00:18:42,572 Budget reviews it before it's sent to 414 00:18:42,572 --> 00:18:44,794 Capitol Hill , which will all lead upto 415 00:18:44,794 --> 00:18:48,770 next February . Okay , we'll 416 00:18:48,770 --> 00:18:50,770 come back in the room . Teoh , just 417 00:18:50,770 --> 00:18:52,881 ogle . Thank you . Um , on page 10 of 418 00:18:52,881 --> 00:18:54,890 the space strategy , there was a 419 00:18:54,900 --> 00:18:58,050 diagram that said , um , counter space 420 00:18:58,050 --> 00:19:00,350 continual . Who , at the very end , it 421 00:19:00,350 --> 00:19:03,490 said nuclear detonation in space . And 422 00:19:03,490 --> 00:19:06,050 I'm wondering if you can clarify who 423 00:19:06,100 --> 00:19:08,390 with detonate a nuclear weapon in space 424 00:19:08,400 --> 00:19:11,940 and why . Yeah , So , 425 00:19:11,950 --> 00:19:15,750 um , so that shorthand is called new 426 00:19:15,750 --> 00:19:18,380 debt . Nuclear detection , detection , 427 00:19:18,390 --> 00:19:21,740 detonation , nuclear detonation in 428 00:19:21,740 --> 00:19:24,580 space , and we do have capabilities 429 00:19:24,800 --> 00:19:27,960 called new debt , which detect those 430 00:19:27,960 --> 00:19:30,620 sorts of events . In fact , we have 431 00:19:30,830 --> 00:19:33,150 those sorts of detection systems on 432 00:19:33,150 --> 00:19:35,990 satellites in space today . That has 433 00:19:35,990 --> 00:19:38,323 been a concern , actually , in a threat , 434 00:19:38,323 --> 00:19:41,580 going back to even the Cold War and the 435 00:19:41,590 --> 00:19:45,390 challenge of a nuclear detonation 436 00:19:45,670 --> 00:19:48,400 is it creates an electromagnetic pulse 437 00:19:48,400 --> 00:19:50,870 and a signal that then could take out 438 00:19:50,880 --> 00:19:53,620 indiscriminately . Many satellites in 439 00:19:53,620 --> 00:19:56,450 space on essentially fried the electron 440 00:19:56,450 --> 00:19:59,660 ICS . So that is a very serious threat . 441 00:19:59,980 --> 00:20:03,400 Um , and we , uh , ensure that we're 442 00:20:03,400 --> 00:20:06,510 prepared for it now that that goes on a 443 00:20:06,510 --> 00:20:09,890 continuum of of a range of threats that 444 00:20:09,890 --> 00:20:11,946 we have to be prepared for potential 445 00:20:11,946 --> 00:20:14,220 adversaries to employ . Correct me if 446 00:20:14,220 --> 00:20:16,540 I'm wrong , but I don't think any 447 00:20:16,550 --> 00:20:18,880 satellites are hardened or protected 448 00:20:18,880 --> 00:20:21,270 against this kind of GNP . So what can 449 00:20:21,270 --> 00:20:24,280 you realistically do ? So I'm not gonna 450 00:20:24,280 --> 00:20:26,680 get into the details of it , But we do 451 00:20:26,680 --> 00:20:30,640 have systems that are assured toe 452 00:20:30,650 --> 00:20:33,580 various threats to include the 453 00:20:33,580 --> 00:20:36,520 necessary hardening against threats 454 00:20:36,520 --> 00:20:39,550 such as this . And if you look at our 455 00:20:39,550 --> 00:20:41,850 space , our overall space 456 00:20:41,850 --> 00:20:44,150 constellations , we have a variety of 457 00:20:44,150 --> 00:20:46,620 systems that range from nuclear command 458 00:20:46,620 --> 00:20:49,050 and control and missile warning 459 00:20:49,820 --> 00:20:52,180 capabilities that we are going to need 460 00:20:52,180 --> 00:20:54,510 to assure those capabilities all the 461 00:20:54,510 --> 00:20:56,960 way from peace timeto low in conflict 462 00:20:57,060 --> 00:20:59,530 all the way through potentially a 463 00:20:59,530 --> 00:21:01,890 nuclear conflict . There's other 464 00:21:01,890 --> 00:21:05,630 systems that that we would 465 00:21:05,640 --> 00:21:07,850 accept some sort of degraded service , 466 00:21:08,420 --> 00:21:10,087 depending on the needs of the 467 00:21:10,087 --> 00:21:12,198 warfighter . So it all comes down toe 468 00:21:12,198 --> 00:21:14,198 warfighter requirements to meet the 469 00:21:14,198 --> 00:21:16,364 mission through the various conflict . 470 00:21:16,364 --> 00:21:18,420 Face of conflict to say , the United 471 00:21:18,420 --> 00:21:20,753 States is concerned that Russia , China , 472 00:21:20,753 --> 00:21:22,809 North Korea or Iran could detonate a 473 00:21:22,809 --> 00:21:24,753 nuclear weapon in space that would 474 00:21:24,753 --> 00:21:28,270 blind its satellites . That is a threat 475 00:21:28,270 --> 00:21:30,492 that we have to potentially be prepared 476 00:21:30,492 --> 00:21:34,440 for is a nuclear detonation in space . 477 00:21:36,340 --> 00:21:39,020 After the phone line go Teoh Abraham 478 00:21:39,020 --> 00:21:40,853 mashing with Washington Examiner 479 00:21:43,740 --> 00:21:46,190 Yes , thank you for taking my question . 480 00:21:46,290 --> 00:21:48,750 So you've mentioned a little bit about , 481 00:21:49,520 --> 00:21:51,131 Of course , China and Russia 482 00:21:51,131 --> 00:21:53,187 weaponizing space and you talk about 483 00:21:53,187 --> 00:21:56,800 hardening satellites . But what about 484 00:21:56,970 --> 00:22:00,520 our own weapons in space ? Can you 485 00:22:00,570 --> 00:22:02,990 comment at all of what we currently 486 00:22:02,990 --> 00:22:06,680 have and what we are working on ? Thank 487 00:22:06,680 --> 00:22:09,220 you . So I'm not going to speak to 488 00:22:09,220 --> 00:22:12,180 specific systems year today , but our 489 00:22:12,180 --> 00:22:15,550 policy and strategy recognizes the 490 00:22:15,550 --> 00:22:17,350 multitude of anti satellite 491 00:22:17,350 --> 00:22:19,630 developments of our competitors . And 492 00:22:19,630 --> 00:22:22,550 we emphasize space mission assurance 493 00:22:22,720 --> 00:22:25,940 and resilience , deterring aggression 494 00:22:25,950 --> 00:22:28,770 against against the United States to 495 00:22:28,770 --> 00:22:31,450 include against our space systems and 496 00:22:31,450 --> 00:22:34,470 those of our allies and partners . And , 497 00:22:34,480 --> 00:22:37,510 uh , and the capability were fighting 498 00:22:37,510 --> 00:22:39,566 capability to protect and defend our 499 00:22:39,566 --> 00:22:41,810 vital interests . The United States is 500 00:22:41,810 --> 00:22:43,660 addressing its security needs 501 00:22:43,660 --> 00:22:46,440 consistent with its obligations under 502 00:22:46,450 --> 00:22:48,600 the Outer Space Treaty and other 503 00:22:48,600 --> 00:22:50,933 relevant international and national law . 504 00:22:51,440 --> 00:22:53,662 And with China and Russia both actively 505 00:22:53,662 --> 00:22:56,510 developing capabilities to negate us , 506 00:22:56,510 --> 00:22:59,190 allied and partner space systems were 507 00:22:59,190 --> 00:23:01,410 left with no choice but to ensure we 508 00:23:01,410 --> 00:23:03,760 are prepared with the necessary means 509 00:23:03,760 --> 00:23:05,816 to protect and defend ourselves from 510 00:23:05,816 --> 00:23:08,320 attacks to our systems , whether they 511 00:23:08,320 --> 00:23:10,530 be in space , on the ground or any 512 00:23:10,530 --> 00:23:13,230 other domain . Okay , we'll stay on the 513 00:23:13,230 --> 00:23:15,174 phone lines for one more with Tony 514 00:23:15,174 --> 00:23:18,160 compassion with Bloomberg . Such 515 00:23:18,780 --> 00:23:20,447 technologies for the future . 516 00:23:24,210 --> 00:23:27,350 Sorry , was that Tony ? No . Go ahead , 517 00:23:27,350 --> 00:23:28,350 Tony , 518 00:23:31,650 --> 00:23:34,810 Can I get a question or you ? Yeah . I 519 00:23:34,980 --> 00:23:36,980 want to follow up on this one . The 520 00:23:36,980 --> 00:23:39,091 United States is developing the metal 521 00:23:39,091 --> 00:23:41,290 lands counter jamming system . They 522 00:23:41,290 --> 00:23:43,346 want to buy , like , 48 of them over 523 00:23:43,346 --> 00:23:45,401 the next six years . Where this this 524 00:23:45,401 --> 00:23:47,568 system play in terms of the strategy . 525 00:23:47,568 --> 00:23:49,401 Is this an example of developing 526 00:23:49,401 --> 00:23:51,346 systems to deny the hostile use of 527 00:23:51,350 --> 00:23:55,200 space ? So I'm not going to speak 528 00:23:55,200 --> 00:23:57,560 Teoh specific systems , but line of 529 00:23:57,560 --> 00:24:01,540 effort one speaks toe building a 530 00:24:01,550 --> 00:24:04,200 comprehensive military advantage in 531 00:24:04,200 --> 00:24:07,700 space . And one of the key aspects I'd 532 00:24:07,710 --> 00:24:10,830 really like to emphasize is that we're 533 00:24:10,830 --> 00:24:13,170 not just thinking about satellites or 534 00:24:13,180 --> 00:24:16,300 ground systems . We're thinking about 535 00:24:16,310 --> 00:24:18,477 the entire organized train equip cycle 536 00:24:18,477 --> 00:24:20,366 in line of effort . One is really 537 00:24:20,366 --> 00:24:23,160 focused on building not only the 538 00:24:23,160 --> 00:24:25,690 capabilities such a satellites , ground 539 00:24:25,690 --> 00:24:28,780 systems , but also developing the 540 00:24:28,790 --> 00:24:31,990 people and experts expertise and 541 00:24:31,990 --> 00:24:34,850 doctrine for this warfighting domains . 542 00:24:35,440 --> 00:24:37,607 And that's really when you think about 543 00:24:37,607 --> 00:24:39,773 that change and really what what is in 544 00:24:39,773 --> 00:24:42,350 this strategy is this fundamental 545 00:24:42,350 --> 00:24:44,830 change to how approaching space . And 546 00:24:44,830 --> 00:24:47,340 it's not just thinking as space as a 547 00:24:47,340 --> 00:24:49,173 support function where we put up 548 00:24:49,173 --> 00:24:51,229 satellites , they're always gonna be 549 00:24:51,229 --> 00:24:53,310 there for us and on no provides the 550 00:24:53,310 --> 00:24:55,421 capabilities we need in peace time in 551 00:24:55,421 --> 00:24:57,588 crisis and conflict . This is thinking 552 00:24:57,588 --> 00:25:00,060 about it like our military forces do in 553 00:25:00,070 --> 00:25:02,330 other domains where we are prepared . 554 00:25:02,340 --> 00:25:04,562 We are ready . We're thinking about how 555 00:25:04,562 --> 00:25:06,451 we can compete to turn win in the 556 00:25:06,451 --> 00:25:08,300 domain , and that gets to the 557 00:25:08,300 --> 00:25:10,650 fundamental importance of establishing 558 00:25:10,650 --> 00:25:13,270 a space force of a group of people who 559 00:25:13,270 --> 00:25:15,381 are focused on this domain . And it's 560 00:25:15,381 --> 00:25:17,603 not only focused on the unique elements 561 00:25:17,603 --> 00:25:19,890 of the domain and the expertise on it , 562 00:25:20,000 --> 00:25:22,910 but also just as importantly , has 563 00:25:22,910 --> 00:25:25,470 focused on integrating space into the 564 00:25:25,470 --> 00:25:27,460 joint force and providing those 565 00:25:27,460 --> 00:25:29,182 capabilities to the warfighter 566 00:25:29,182 --> 00:25:31,349 throughout the conflict capabilities . 567 00:25:31,370 --> 00:25:33,314 You've spent a lot of time talking 568 00:25:33,314 --> 00:25:35,481 rehashing the Russian capabilities out 569 00:25:35,481 --> 00:25:37,537 there , which is important . But the 570 00:25:37,537 --> 00:25:39,703 public needs to know the United States 571 00:25:39,703 --> 00:25:43,270 is helpless . Yeah , and a ZAY said 572 00:25:43,270 --> 00:25:45,492 we're gonna speak to specific systems . 573 00:25:45,492 --> 00:25:48,070 We absolutely , I mean that this is a 574 00:25:48,070 --> 00:25:51,130 strategy to ensure that we are ready 575 00:25:51,130 --> 00:25:53,400 for these threats that we're facing in 576 00:25:53,400 --> 00:25:56,940 the domain . And there are a variety of 577 00:25:56,940 --> 00:25:59,330 ways to do that . And this goes to the 578 00:25:59,330 --> 00:26:01,552 whole Mission Assurance Framework where 579 00:26:01,552 --> 00:26:04,010 we're able to assure our systems which 580 00:26:04,010 --> 00:26:07,030 has elements of resilience as elements 581 00:26:07,030 --> 00:26:09,070 of defense . It measures and as 582 00:26:09,070 --> 00:26:10,681 elements of even think about 583 00:26:10,681 --> 00:26:13,140 reconstituting in a conflict . So 584 00:26:13,140 --> 00:26:15,307 there's a variety of ways to do this . 585 00:26:15,307 --> 00:26:17,196 We have to think about our entire 586 00:26:17,196 --> 00:26:19,251 approach and this is really what the 587 00:26:19,251 --> 00:26:21,084 Space Force as well as the Space 588 00:26:21,084 --> 00:26:23,940 Development Agency , which has a new 589 00:26:23,940 --> 00:26:26,770 approach to how we're looking at at our 590 00:26:26,770 --> 00:26:28,881 space architectures , which is really 591 00:26:28,881 --> 00:26:30,890 complementary to the space force 592 00:26:30,890 --> 00:26:33,720 activities . But at the right point in 593 00:26:33,720 --> 00:26:36,430 the future will merge in tow the US 594 00:26:36,430 --> 00:26:40,350 Space Force . Okay , we'll come back 595 00:26:40,350 --> 00:26:41,461 into the room now . 596 00:26:44,040 --> 00:26:47,760 10 . Also cooperation with the space 597 00:26:47,770 --> 00:26:51,010 development can iter how they 598 00:26:51,020 --> 00:26:55,010 participation Japanese , the government 599 00:26:55,020 --> 00:26:58,600 space more . You also have a day at the 600 00:26:58,600 --> 00:27:01,780 country canon viable of it like this 601 00:27:01,780 --> 00:27:05,670 House Korea's So Japan 602 00:27:05,670 --> 00:27:08,680 has been , ah , a very close ally and 603 00:27:08,680 --> 00:27:10,970 growing ally in our space program . In 604 00:27:10,970 --> 00:27:13,081 fact , I've been there multiple times 605 00:27:13,410 --> 00:27:16,420 in this job and I'd highlight a couple 606 00:27:16,420 --> 00:27:18,642 areas that we're working really closely 607 00:27:18,642 --> 00:27:22,370 with them is , um , one 608 00:27:22,610 --> 00:27:24,940 is they have a system that they're 609 00:27:24,940 --> 00:27:27,160 putting into space called cues E SS . 610 00:27:27,440 --> 00:27:29,840 It's essentially their version of a 611 00:27:29,840 --> 00:27:32,240 global positioning system for their 612 00:27:32,240 --> 00:27:34,296 national needs to provide position , 613 00:27:34,296 --> 00:27:36,840 navigation and timing nationally for 614 00:27:36,850 --> 00:27:39,270 the Japanese in that region . And what 615 00:27:39,270 --> 00:27:41,381 we're doing is we're putting a hosted 616 00:27:41,381 --> 00:27:43,710 payload , a space situational awareness 617 00:27:43,710 --> 00:27:46,670 payload on the Japanese satellite in 618 00:27:46,670 --> 00:27:48,980 the form of developing or partnership 619 00:27:48,990 --> 00:27:52,730 deeper with our cooperation with our 620 00:27:52,740 --> 00:27:54,820 architectural satellite systems . 621 00:27:55,090 --> 00:27:57,670 They're also , though , send people to 622 00:27:57,670 --> 00:27:59,448 the United States to go through 623 00:27:59,448 --> 00:28:01,337 training to further develop their 624 00:28:01,337 --> 00:28:03,448 workforce . And I'd end by mentioning 625 00:28:03,448 --> 00:28:05,850 that they recently stood up a new space 626 00:28:05,850 --> 00:28:09,780 to focus military unit . Andi , uh , 627 00:28:09,790 --> 00:28:11,846 were very supportive of that . Their 628 00:28:11,846 --> 00:28:13,590 activities and their further 629 00:28:13,590 --> 00:28:16,610 development because they recognize , um , 630 00:28:16,690 --> 00:28:18,857 as I mentioned earlier , as many other 631 00:28:18,857 --> 00:28:20,930 nations are recognizing just how 632 00:28:20,930 --> 00:28:23,410 critical space is and how threatened it 633 00:28:23,410 --> 00:28:25,720 is . So we , as nations have to be 634 00:28:25,720 --> 00:28:27,942 prepared for this strategic environment 635 00:28:27,942 --> 00:28:31,380 that we find ourselves in that okay , 636 00:28:31,540 --> 00:28:35,080 one more in the room are is is an 637 00:28:35,080 --> 00:28:38,380 offensive capability in space part of 638 00:28:38,380 --> 00:28:41,450 the strategy here or , you know , is a 639 00:28:41,450 --> 00:28:43,770 simpler or we still looking manly 640 00:28:43,770 --> 00:28:45,690 defense . Is there you ? If the 641 00:28:45,690 --> 00:28:47,700 Russians have a satellite that can 642 00:28:47,700 --> 00:28:49,790 shoot projectiles , is that gonna be 643 00:28:49,790 --> 00:28:52,740 part of our future ? 644 00:28:53,140 --> 00:28:55,550 I'd go back , Teoh . I'd encourage you 645 00:28:55,550 --> 00:28:57,630 to read that details of the strategy 646 00:28:57,630 --> 00:28:59,741 which do talk about and I'm not going 647 00:28:59,741 --> 00:29:01,741 to talk about specific systems here 648 00:29:01,741 --> 00:29:03,908 today , but what it emphasizes that is 649 00:29:03,908 --> 00:29:06,074 that we are gonna have space . We need 650 00:29:06,074 --> 00:29:08,130 to mean to inner space superiority , 651 00:29:08,130 --> 00:29:10,186 which includes having the freedom of 652 00:29:10,186 --> 00:29:12,820 operation in the domain , assuring 653 00:29:12,820 --> 00:29:15,060 these capabilities to our warfighters 654 00:29:15,070 --> 00:29:17,237 throughout the conflict and being able 655 00:29:17,237 --> 00:29:19,390 to protect and defend against hostile 656 00:29:19,390 --> 00:29:22,390 space activities to our interest or 657 00:29:22,390 --> 00:29:25,510 other nations interest . Um , there's a 658 00:29:25,510 --> 00:29:27,510 lot of ways to look at this , and I 659 00:29:27,510 --> 00:29:29,680 just mentioned briefly as you're 660 00:29:29,680 --> 00:29:33,400 thinking about space there . There's 661 00:29:33,400 --> 00:29:35,456 three , if not four components toe . 662 00:29:35,456 --> 00:29:37,400 Think about very often There's the 663 00:29:37,400 --> 00:29:39,710 satellites themselves . There's the 664 00:29:39,710 --> 00:29:41,766 ground station that's commanding and 665 00:29:41,766 --> 00:29:44,099 controlling it and doing the processing . 666 00:29:44,099 --> 00:29:46,266 There's the link in between , which is 667 00:29:46,266 --> 00:29:48,340 sending signals to space . And in 668 00:29:48,340 --> 00:29:50,600 certain systems you'll have a user 669 00:29:50,600 --> 00:29:52,620 terminal , such as a GPS terminal 670 00:29:52,620 --> 00:29:54,287 that's getting the signals or 671 00:29:54,287 --> 00:29:56,310 communications device . So as we're 672 00:29:56,310 --> 00:29:58,254 thinking about conflict , we think 673 00:29:58,254 --> 00:30:01,880 about all these elements of of the 674 00:30:01,890 --> 00:30:03,779 space systems and how we're gonna 675 00:30:03,779 --> 00:30:06,900 approach space war fighting . We have 676 00:30:06,900 --> 00:30:09,122 time for one more question on the phone 677 00:30:09,122 --> 00:30:11,344 with Dan Boyce , Cholera Public radio . 678 00:30:13,740 --> 00:30:17,080 Thank you , Deputy Secretary , Looking 679 00:30:17,080 --> 00:30:20,760 at a line here in the executive summary , 680 00:30:21,540 --> 00:30:23,800 it says that we're talking about China 681 00:30:23,800 --> 00:30:25,522 and Russia here that they have 682 00:30:25,522 --> 00:30:27,633 capabilities specifically designed to 683 00:30:27,633 --> 00:30:31,010 contest or deny us access to and 684 00:30:31,020 --> 00:30:34,770 operations in the domain . Can you 685 00:30:34,770 --> 00:30:37,030 address more to what it means , what 686 00:30:37,030 --> 00:30:40,490 you mean by access to the domain . The 687 00:30:40,490 --> 00:30:42,768 operations part . I think I understand . 688 00:30:42,768 --> 00:30:45,190 But does that mean sort of preventing a 689 00:30:45,200 --> 00:30:47,311 satellite from launching into space , 690 00:30:47,311 --> 00:30:49,820 or even , say , the civilian space 691 00:30:49,820 --> 00:30:52,670 industry or scientific component of our 692 00:30:52,670 --> 00:30:54,837 space endeavours ? Could you just talk 693 00:30:54,837 --> 00:30:57,003 a little bit more about that ? So when 694 00:30:57,003 --> 00:30:59,114 when thinking about access to one way 695 00:30:59,114 --> 00:31:01,281 to think about it , is launch system ? 696 00:31:01,281 --> 00:31:03,670 So yes , I mean , theoretically , you 697 00:31:03,670 --> 00:31:05,781 could use some sort of system to take 698 00:31:05,781 --> 00:31:08,230 out our launch sites , which would be 699 00:31:08,510 --> 00:31:10,288 one reason to be thinking about 700 00:31:10,288 --> 00:31:12,010 ensuring we have the necessary 701 00:31:12,010 --> 00:31:13,843 resiliency in our overall launch 702 00:31:13,843 --> 00:31:15,621 program . But another way , and 703 00:31:15,621 --> 00:31:18,730 thinking about access to is , goes back 704 00:31:18,730 --> 00:31:20,952 to that previous statement I was making 705 00:31:20,952 --> 00:31:23,008 about thinking about components of a 706 00:31:23,008 --> 00:31:25,950 space system , so access to includes 707 00:31:25,950 --> 00:31:28,810 the link in between . So when you have 708 00:31:28,810 --> 00:31:31,540 a ground system that's communicating to 709 00:31:31,550 --> 00:31:34,560 a satellite system , access to is 710 00:31:34,560 --> 00:31:36,393 actually those communications in 711 00:31:36,393 --> 00:31:39,140 between . So if they're preventing our 712 00:31:39,150 --> 00:31:42,960 access to our space systems to 713 00:31:42,960 --> 00:31:45,127 include those communications , we have 714 00:31:45,127 --> 00:31:47,810 to be ready for , for instance , those 715 00:31:47,810 --> 00:31:51,380 sorts of methods to to deny us the use 716 00:31:51,380 --> 00:31:53,450 of space so said another way , If 717 00:31:53,450 --> 00:31:55,728 they're going to jam our space systems , 718 00:31:56,180 --> 00:31:59,480 then that is going to be something that 719 00:31:59,480 --> 00:32:02,460 we're gonna have to be ready to deal 720 00:32:02,460 --> 00:32:05,870 with those sorts of threats . Last 721 00:32:05,870 --> 00:32:08,092 question to motion . Here in the room . 722 00:32:08,140 --> 00:32:10,307 Thank you . Thank you for doing this . 723 00:32:10,307 --> 00:32:12,473 Just given what you said about posture 724 00:32:12,473 --> 00:32:16,090 of us and , uh , China . Russia . 725 00:32:16,210 --> 00:32:18,210 Just kind of a basic question . How 726 00:32:18,210 --> 00:32:20,490 vulnerable do you think the U . S is 727 00:32:20,660 --> 00:32:24,270 against a new attack By saying Russia 728 00:32:24,270 --> 00:32:25,492 or trying to expect ? 729 00:32:28,520 --> 00:32:31,800 Well , um , I would say that we were 730 00:32:31,800 --> 00:32:34,850 still ahead of them . Um , but are , 731 00:32:35,240 --> 00:32:38,590 uh , we We are absolutely at 732 00:32:38,600 --> 00:32:41,230 risk with the pace that they're 733 00:32:41,230 --> 00:32:43,990 developing these capabilities , and 734 00:32:43,990 --> 00:32:47,420 these are very serious threats , and 735 00:32:47,430 --> 00:32:51,000 you can see in the strategy itself it , 736 00:32:51,190 --> 00:32:55,080 uh it talks about 737 00:32:55,430 --> 00:32:59,050 the central problem . The US 738 00:32:59,050 --> 00:33:01,940 space enterprise was not built for the 739 00:33:01,940 --> 00:33:04,610 current strategic environment , and 740 00:33:04,610 --> 00:33:07,260 that really gets to this thought of the 741 00:33:07,270 --> 00:33:09,326 enterprise that we've created in the 742 00:33:09,326 --> 00:33:11,810 past , which was this support function . 743 00:33:11,890 --> 00:33:13,557 We're just gonna launch these 744 00:33:13,557 --> 00:33:15,668 satellites and they're gonna be there 745 00:33:15,668 --> 00:33:17,790 for us , and we're not . We're not 746 00:33:17,800 --> 00:33:20,770 fully steeped in the whole 747 00:33:21,750 --> 00:33:24,470 element of building our forces as well 748 00:33:24,470 --> 00:33:27,350 as a point employing our forces for 749 00:33:27,350 --> 00:33:31,260 conflict to extend into the domain . Um , 750 00:33:31,270 --> 00:33:33,770 so so that's this transformation that's 751 00:33:33,770 --> 00:33:35,937 happening right now . And we have this 752 00:33:35,937 --> 00:33:38,103 unique , unique moment right now where 753 00:33:38,103 --> 00:33:40,270 we're standing up the space force were 754 00:33:40,270 --> 00:33:42,381 standing up the space command , space 755 00:33:42,381 --> 00:33:44,492 development agencies , standing up or 756 00:33:44,492 --> 00:33:46,548 national leadership . And when I see 757 00:33:46,548 --> 00:33:48,603 national leadership , I mean both in 758 00:33:48,603 --> 00:33:50,214 the executive branch and the 759 00:33:50,214 --> 00:33:52,670 legislative branch has significant 760 00:33:52,790 --> 00:33:55,340 alignment in addressing these 761 00:33:55,340 --> 00:33:57,284 challenges and ensuring that we're 762 00:33:57,284 --> 00:33:59,790 postured to protect a defender interest 763 00:33:59,790 --> 00:34:02,910 in space . That that that's what 764 00:34:02,920 --> 00:34:05,142 insurance . That's what this is about , 765 00:34:05,142 --> 00:34:07,210 ensuring we're ready to do that and 766 00:34:07,210 --> 00:34:08,377 maintain that lead . 767 00:34:11,230 --> 00:34:13,508 Thank you , everybody for coming today . 768 00:34:13,508 --> 00:34:15,619 If you have any follow up questions , 769 00:34:15,619 --> 00:34:15,060 you know where to find me on the desk .